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The Almost-Restatement of Income
Tax of 1954
WHEN TAX GIANTS ROAMED THE EARTH*
Lawrence Zelenak†
INTRODUCTION
The American Law Institute (ALI) has published
Restatements of about two dozen areas of the law, ranging
alphabetically from Agency to Unfair Competition. Even an
unbiased observer (that is, anyone other than a tax lawyer)
would probably concede that federal income taxation is at least
as important a field as a number of the areas of the law that
have been blessed with Restatements.
Why, then, has the ALI never produced—or even
attempted—a Restatement of the Law of Federal Income
Taxation? One might suppose it is because the goal of restating
federal income tax law has been too ambitious for even the
redoubtable ALI, but the truth is closer to the opposite—that a
mere Restatement was not ambitious enough. According to the
ALI, Restatements “reflect the law as it presently stands or
might plausibly be stated by a court. Restatement black-letter
formulations assume the stance of describing the law as it is.”1
When the ALI embarked on its Income Tax Project in 1948, it
was not interested in the relatively modest goal of describing
existing tax law. Rather, its ambition was “to prepare . . . an
improved and modernized income tax statute with explanatory
comments, which will be presented . . . for such consideration as
Congress may wish to give it.”2 In the ALI’s project classification
system, this meant that the goal of the Project was the
© 2014 Lawrence Zelenak. All Rights Reserved.
Pamela B. Gann Professor of Law, Duke Law School.
1 ALI
Overview, A.L.I., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction+projects
(last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
2 Herbert F. Goodrich, Annual Report of the Director, 1948 A.L.I. PROC. 1, 16
(quoting a statement of an anonymous participant in the Income Tax Project).
*
†
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production not of a Restatement, but of a model code. Again
according to the ALI, “Model codes . . . are addressed mainly to
legislatures, with a view toward legislative enactment.
Statutory formulations assume the stance of prescribing the
law as it shall be.”3
From the vantage point of 2013, the goal of creating a
complete model federal income tax statute seems absurdly
ambitious. Yet by February 1954—just in time for consideration
by Congress in the drafting of what became the Internal
Revenue Code of 19544—the ALI had produced a nearlycomplete draft of an income tax statute.5 By design, the Draft
did not include procedural provisions, provisions applicable to a
few special classes of taxpayers (“such as insurance companies”),
or provisions in a few other highly specialized areas (such as
“pension[s,] trusts[,] and employee benefits”).6 Subject to those
few exceptions, the 1954 Draft was a complete income tax
statute.7 Published in two volumes, the 1954 Draft featured
374 pages of proposed statutory language, accompanied by 587
pages of explanatory comments.
Although Congress left large chunks of the ALI’s Draft
on the cutting room floor, it also followed (to varying degrees)
the ALI’s lead on many topics—including, perhaps most
significantly, a complete revision of the partnership tax rules.8
Both commentators who applauded the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 and those who lamented it agreed that the ALI’s
fingerprints were all over the Code. Writing in 1955, prominent
New York tax attorney Norris Darrell, who viewed the 1954
Code as “a most commendable accomplishment,”9 opined that
“without the Institute’s groundwork we would not now have the
new Code.”10 Writing in 1960, Columbia Law School Professor
William L. Cary, who viewed the 1954 Code as “both erroneously
conceived and poorly executed,” described the Code as

ALI Overview, supra note 1.
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 3 (1954).
5 See A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME TAX STATUTE (Draft, Feb. 1954) [hereinafter
1954 DRAFT or DRAFT].
6 Id. at xxxi-xxxii.
7 See id.
8 Compare II ALI, FEDERAL INCOME TAX STATUTE (Draft, Feb. 1954) [hereinafter
ALI VOLUME II], with Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §§ 701-71, 68A Stat. at 239-54.
9 Norris Darrell, Internal Revenue Code of 1954—A Striking Example of the
Legislative Process in Action, 1955 S. CAL. TAX INST. 1, 25 (1955).
10 Id. at 21.
3
4
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“follow[ing] in the Institute’s footsteps—though carelessly and
inconsistently.”11
If the ALI were to propose today the drafting of a nearly
complete model federal income tax statute for the twenty-first
century, in the hopes that the model would guide Congress in its
revisions of the Internal Revenue Code, informed observers would
view the ALI as taking on a doubly hopeless task—hopeless in
terms of both the drafting challenge and the political challenge.
Circumstances have changed drastically since 1954. The nonprocedural aspects of the current federal income tax occupy
nearly 2,350 pages of the current (2012) United States Code—
more than six times the number of pages in the ALI’s draft.12 If a
2013 model code were to approximate the level of detail of the
current Internal Revenue Code, the drafting challenge would be
several times more daunting than the challenge faced by the
midcentury ALI. And today’s political barriers to the enactment of
tax reform legislation dwarf those of 1954. As of 2012, virtually all
Republican members of Congress had taken the no-tax-increase
pledge of Grover Norquist’s Americans for Tax Reform,13 and even
a revenue-neutral Code revision focused on technical
improvements would inevitably include many provisions that
Norquist would describe as tax increases.14
Even granting these differences in circumstances, it is
difficult for a tax lawyer in 2013, viewing the handiwork of the
midcentury ALI’s tax experts, to resist the conclusion that tax
giants once roamed the earth. Neither those giants nor their
descendants have been spotted in recent decades. Although the
ALI has remained active in the federal tax arena, producing a
number of focused projects on particular aspects of the income tax
(including the income taxation of corporations, partnerships,

11 William L. Cary, Reflections Upon the American Law Institute Tax Project
and the Internal Revenue Code: A Plea for a Moratorium and Reappraisal, 60 COLUM.
L. REV. 259, 261 (1960).
12 The pages of the ALI Draft and those of the current Code are not strictly
comparable. On the one hand, the Code fits more words on a page than does the ALI
Draft. On the other hand, the Code contains copious information on effective dates and
amendments, in addition to the Code itself. The differences work in opposite directions. It
appears that the differences may approximately offset each other, in which case the page
counts may, after all, give a good sense of the relative lengths of the two productions.
13 Jonathan Weisman, At Fiscal Cliff, Anti-Tax Vow Gets New Look, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 2012, at A1.
14 To take an example more-or-less at random, the elimination of the
charitable deduction for unrealized appreciation in donated property is something the
ALI might propose as improving the structural coherence of the income tax, but it
would undeniably result in tax increases for donors.
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trusts, and estates),15 it has never again attempted the drafting of
a comprehensive model income tax statute.
This essay describes the ALI’s Income Tax Project of
1948–1954—its origins, goals, drafting process, final product,
and influence on Congress. The essay concludes with some
thoughts on what role the ALI can and should play today in the
tax legislative process. Whether the fault is in the stars or in
ourselves (probably both, but with the stars deserving most of the
blame), the drafting of a new ALI model income tax statute for
the twenty-first century would be an almost insurmountable
challenge in technical terms, and probably pointless in political
terms. Nevertheless, there remains room for targeted ALI tax
interventions, with a Restatement-type approach to the
interpretation of the recently-codified economic substance
doctrine16 seeming especially promising.
I.

THE MIDCENTURY INCOME TAX PROJECT: GENESIS,
GOALS, AND PROCESS

The ALI’s Income Tax Project began in 1948.17
According to ALI Director Herbert Goodrich, in 1946 Colin
Stam, the long-time Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation,18 informally suggested to Norris Darrell that an ALIproduced model income tax statute could be helpful to the Joint
Committee and to Congress.19 Leading members of the Senate
Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee
added their unofficial encouragement, as did high-level Treasury
officials.20 ALI President Harrison Tweed told a slightly different
version of the story. According to Tweed, the Project grew out of
some discussions which one of the members of our Council had . . . with
representatives of the Treasury, the Joint Committee, and the
15 The ALI’s post-1954 income tax projects are described infra notes 111-120
and accompanying text.
16 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o) (2011). The statute defines the doctrine as “the
common law doctrine under which tax benefits under subtitle A with respect to a
transaction are not allowable if the transaction does not have economic substance or
lacks a business purpose.” Id.
17 Darrell, supra note 9, at 17-18.
18 “The Joint Committee on Taxation is a nonpartisan [congressional
committee] . . . chaired on a rotating basis by the Chairman of the Senate Finance
Committee and the Chairman of House Ways and Means Committee.” Overview, JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, https://www.jct.gov/about-us/overview.html (last visited Oct.
30, 2013) (providing a fuller description of the Committee).
19 General Revenue Provision: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and
Means, 83d Cong. 1812-13 (1953) [hereinafter General Revenue Provision Hearings]
(statement of Herbert F. Goodrich, judge, U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the 3d Cir.).
20 Id. at 1813; see also Darrell, supra note 9, at 17.
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committees of the two Houses of Congress. They expressed the hope and
the expectation that something might be done by the Institute to help in
the situation which then existed and has existed for a long while, that
the Income Tax Law needed overhauling and some fairly major
changes and alterations in the judgment of a disinterested body.21

The ALI sought funding for the project from the Maurice
and Laura Falk Foundation of Pittsburgh, and received an initial
grant of $225,000, later supplemented by additional grants,
bringing the total to $620,00022 (over $6 million in 2013 dollars).23
Harvard Law School Professor Stanley S. Surrey was appointed
Chief Reporter for the Project, and Columbia Law School
Professor (later Dean) William C. Warren was appointed
Associate Chief Reporter.24 A small but elite army aided the
reporters’ efforts. The reporters were advised by a 10-member Tax
Policy Committee consisting of eight leading tax attorneys, along
with the President and the Director of the ALI.25 The reporters
were assisted by nine special consultants whose duties focused
on various aspects of the Project.26 The reporters also regularly
sought the input of a Tax Advisory Group composed of the
members of the Policy Committee, the special consultants, and
more than 50 tax law luminaries from around the country.27
For several years the Policy Committee convened “about
once a month for [a] one [or] two-day meeting[ ] ” to determine
the policies to be embodied in the model statute and to review
proposed provisions drafted by the Reporters with the aid of
their research assistants.28 Following approval by the Policy
Committee, proposed provisions were presented as discussion
drafts to the Tax Advisory Committee at the annual meeting of
the ALI.29 After further revision in response to the comments of
21 A.L.I., Remarks of Harrison Tweed, 2 26TH ANN. MEETING OF THE ALI IN
JOINT SESSION WITH THE NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 618, 618-19
(1949) [hereinafter Remarks of Harrison Tweed].
22 HERBERT F. GOODRICH & PAUL A. WOLKIN, THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, 1923-1961 29 (1961).
23 CPI Inflation Calculator, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/
data/inflation_calculator.htm (input “620,000” in “$” field, select “1948” in “in”
dropdown menu, then click “calculate”).
24 GOODRICH & WOLKIN, supra note 22, at 30.
25 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at v. Norris Darrell, Erwin Griswold, and
Randolph Paul were among the members of the Policy Committee.
26 Id.
27 Id. at vi. There was nary a woman among the seventy-two members of the
Tax Advisory Group, although there were two women among the two-dozen research
assistants to the reporters. Id. at vii.
28 Stanley S. Surrey & William C. Warren, The Income Tax Project of the
American Law Institute: Gross Income, Deductions, Accounting, Gains and Losses,
Cancellation of Indebtedness, 66 HARV. L. REV. 761, 766 (1953).
29 Id. at 767.
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the Advisory Committee, the discussion drafts were presented
to the 40-member governing Council of the ALI.30 The reporters
then prepared tentative drafts for presentation to the full
membership of the ALI at its annual meetings.31 All told, the
reporters produced 11 tentative drafts.32 In February 1954, with
Congress at work on what was to become the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, the ALI published a compilation of the drafts and
accompanying commentary as its “Federal Income Tax Statute,
February 1954 Draft.”33
In the foreword to the Draft, ALI Director Goodrich
explained that, unlike Restatements, the model statute and
commentary had never been officially promulgated by the ALI.34
He described the statute and commentary as “represent[ing] a
composite of the views of [the] Tax Policy Committee and the
Reporters assisted by the Special Consultants and guided
by . . . the Tax Advisory Group, the Council of the Institute[,] and
the Institute membership and by informal discussion with other
organizations in the tax field.”35 Noting the ongoing tax revision
efforts in Congress, Goodrich observed, “If there ever was a time
when an objective study would be helpful to a legislative
group, . . . this seems to be the time.”36 Four years earlier, near
the inception of the Project, ALI President Tweed—who was
obviously unable to imagine what the Internal Revenue Code
would look like in 2013—had set a low bar for judging the
Project’s real-world success: “Anything that is accomplished
will be worthwhile, because the current situation . . . cannot be
much worse.”37
In describing the goals of the Income Tax Project, the
ALI explained that it intended to steer clear of political bigpicture tax policy issues. Questions such as the design of the
tax rate schedules, whether and how to tax capital gains, and
the double taxation (or not) of corporate income, were all—
emphasized Tweed—“fiscal and political questions into which it
would serve no useful purpose for the Institute to plunge.”38 The
Id.
Id.
32 GOODRICH & WOLKIN, supra note 22, at 29.
33 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5.
34 Id. at iv.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Remarks of Harrison Tweed, supra note 21, at 628.
38 Id. at 624; see also Surrey & Warren, supra note 28, at 764 (making the
same point and giving additional examples of political questions beyond the scope of
the Project, including the tax treatment of municipal bond interest and the percentage
depletion allowance).
30
31
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Project’s ambitions were, nevertheless, considerable. Tweed
insisted that the goal was not “a mere statement of the law as it
now stands,”39 and Surrey and Warren concurred: “It is not a
mere tinkering here and there, a tidying up of one provision or
a smoothing out of another.”40 Rather, explained Surrey and
Warren, the focus of the Project was on the “broad middle
ground . . . which we have come to refer to as the ‘technical’
provisions of the income tax.”41 They elaborated: “The term
‘technical’ is used to contrast the provisions which are largely
shaped by tax technicians . . . with the provisions whose
content is determined by . . . political compromises.”42 Within
that broad middle ground, Goodrich explained, the goal was not
the ALI’s usual goal of restatement: “Here in this field of
legislative drafting we are frankly going to state the law as we
think it should be.”43
In an impressive display of self-confidence—if not
hubris—Surrey and Warren described the Project as “a major
frontal attack on the technical shortcomings of our federal
income tax.”44 Because technical shortcomings permeated the
entire Code, “All of the major segments of the income tax—gross
income, deductions, gains and losses, accounting provisions,
partnerships, trusts, corporations, income from sources abroad—
are within [the Project’s] scope.”45 Viewing such technical issues
as essentially apolitical, Tweed claimed that the ALI’s proposal
would be drafted “by men who know their business but who have
no political axes to grind and have no self-interest to serve.”46
Surrey and Warren acknowledged that the distinction between
big-picture policy questions and technical issues could be
indistinct at the margin, but they confidently asserted that “an
awareness of the difference between the two and a desire to stay
within the confines of technical policy afford proper guidance.”47

Remarks of Harrison Tweed, supra note 21, at 624.
Surrey & Warren, supra note 28, at 765.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Goodrich, supra note 2, at 18.
44 Surrey & Warren, supra note 28, at 765.
45 Id.
46 Remarks of Harrison Tweed, supra note 21, at 629.
47 Surrey & Warren, supra note 28, at 765. At least as of 1948, Judge
Learned Hand was less sanguine about the possibility of separating the technical from
the political. According to Goodrich, Hand remarked that “the subject will develop such
a degree of heat among the members of the Institute that the Director should take the
precaution to have a platoon of police officers on hand to assist the Chairman in
preserving order.” Goodrich, supra note 2, at 23.
39
40
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In addition to the major goal of substantive technical
improvement, the Project had a secondary goal of proposing a
more user-friendly Internal Revenue Code. The drafters aimed
to incorporate important judicial glosses into the statute itself,
and to improve the clarity and readability of the statute.48
Writing in 1953, when most of the work of the Project
had been accomplished but Congress had not yet legislated,
Surrey and Warren pronounced the Project an unqualified
success on the merits: “In no other tax forum has there been so
fair, so objective, or so intelligent a consideration of technical
tax issues . . . . [F]or the first time in the history of the federal
income tax we are becoming really aware of its anatomical
structure, so to speak.”49
Although the influence of the Project on the 1954 Code
can be gauged by comparing the ALI’s February 1954 Draft
with the 1954 legislation (as discussed in the following section
of this essay), there is little direct evidence of the extent to
which the tax-writing committees of Congress and their staffs
consulted with Surrey and Warren or worked from the ALI’s
various tentative drafts. As Goodrich pointed out in his foreword
to the February 1954 Draft, the ALI “does not lobby for this
Code or any other piece of legislation.”50 But as Tax Policy
Committee member Robert Miller remarked, “There is no
question, however, that the men who are engaged in these [ALI]
efforts are favorably known to the congressional committees
and their staffs, and that serious consideration will be given to
the Institute’s recommendations.”51
ALI President Tweed reported in 1949 that Surrey and
Warren had “been in close contact with representatives of the
Joint Committee, and representatives of the Joint Committee
ha[d] attended meetings of the Policy Committee’s hostings.”52
According to Darrell, the Policy Committee, along with Surrey
and Warren and their staff, had two meetings—one in 1953
and one in 1954—with the Joint Committee and Treasury
staffs for wide-ranging discussions of the ALI’s drafts and the
pending legislation.53 Darrell also reported that in 1954 several
of the people most closely connected with the Project “were
Goodrich, supra note 2, at 12-13; see also 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at xvii.
Surrey & Warren, supra note 28, at 768.
50 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at iv.
51 Robert N. Miller, The Law Institute’s Income Tax Project: An Answer to a
Challenge, 37 A.B.A. J. 191, 194 (1951).
52 Remarks of Harrison Tweed, supra note 21, at 621.
53 Darrell, supra note 9, at 19.
48
49
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repeatedly called upon for counsel and advice in connection
with the revision of [the House bill].”54
The most prominent acknowledgment of the legislative
influence of the ALI’s Income Tax Project occurred in August
1953, when ALI Director Goodrich appeared at a tax revision
hearing of the Ways and Means Committee. Emphasizing that
he was not “advocating this or any other publication,” Goodrich
offered the Committee the material the Project had produced to
that point.55 In thanking Goodrich, Committee Chairman Daniel
Reed commented, “You have undertaken what I consider a
monumental and very important piece of work for the whole
country, and you are making a very helpful contribution.”56
II.

A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE ALI’S FEBRUARY 1954
DRAFT AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE 1954 CODE

Judged on its merits, the February 1954 Draft largely
fulfilled the ALI’s goals for the Income Tax Project. The model
statute was clearly—at times even elegantly—drafted. Even
William L. Cary, perhaps the harshest critic of the ALI’s decision
to draft a highly detailed statute (by midcentury standards), who
viewed the ALI’s alleged goal of “SPECIFICITY AT ALL COST”
to have been “erroneously conceived,”57 conceded that the ALI’s
Draft was “well executed” by “superior craftsmen.”58
The successful effort to incorporate established judicial
interpretations of the statute into the statute itself—so as to
make finding the law much easier for non-specialist readers—is
evident throughout the Draft, from the addition of a
nonexclusive list of 20 items includible in gross income,59 to a
codification of the exclusion from gross income of working
condition fringes,60 to a comprehensive compilation of the

Id. at 20.
General Revenue Provision Hearings, supra note 19, at 1814 (statement of
Herbert F. Goodrich).
56 Id. (remarks of Rep. Daniel Reed, Chairman, H. Comm. on Ways and Means).
57 Cary, supra note 11, at 259, 261 (capitalization in original).
58 Id. at 260, 261.
59 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at 25-27. This approach was followed by
Congress. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 61, 68A Stat. 3, 17
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2011)).
60 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at 30. This approach was followed by Congress
three decades later. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 531(a), 98 Stat.
494, 877 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 132(f) (2011)). Working condition fringes are in-kind
benefits received by an employee from an employer, the cost of which would be
deductible by the employee as a business expense if the employee had paid for the
benefits herself.
54
55
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various ways of obtaining a “cost” basis in an asset,61 to a
proposed codification of the doctrine of constructive receipt.62
Surprisingly, however, in a few instances the Draft moved in
the opposite direction, by eliminating existing statutory detail
with the explanation that the detail would be better relegated
to the regulations (but without offering a guiding principle as
to when a detail belonged in the statute and when it belonged
in the regulations).63
As the ALI drafters had promised, they did not limit
themselves to a user-friendly restatement of existing tax law.
They offered ambitious rewrites of substantial portions of the
Internal Revenue Code, sometimes merely to incorporate judicial
glosses into the statute, but often to resolve unsettled issues or
to make significant substantive changes to settled law. For
example, the Draft proposed a much more elaborate statutory
treatment of cancellation-of-indebtedness income, which in some
respects merely added to the statute well-established judicial
(and administrative) interpretations, but in other cases
resolved unsettled issues.64
Significant changes in the Code proposed by the Draft are
far too numerous to describe them all here, but a few
representative examples provide a sense of the Draft’s ambitions.
Among many other changes, the Draft proposed:
–

Nonrecognition of gain and loss, and a transferred
basis regime, for property transferred in connection
with a divorce;65 Congress did not adopt this

61 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at 118-20. Congress has never enacted a
similar provision.
62 Id. at 138-39. Again, Congress has never enacted a similar provision.
Under the doctrine of constructive receipt, “A taxpayer may not deliberately turn his
back upon income and thus select the year for which he will report it.” Hamilton Nat’l
Bank of Chattanooga v. Comm’r, 29 B.T.A. 63, 67 (1933).
63 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at 107, 357 (moving from the statute to the
regulations much of the detail concerning the nonrecognition of gain on the sale of a
personal residence); id. at 148-49, 424 (moving details of the discount bond rules from
the statute to the regulations).
64 See id. at 34-43. One innovation of the ALI’s treatment of cancellation-ofindebtedness income was its choice of mistake-correction over balance-sheet as the
exclusive theory of debt-cancellation income. Id. at 35. Despite the ALI’s efforts, this issue
remains unresolved even today. Lawrence Zelenak, Cancellation-of-Indebtedness Income
and Transactional Accounting, 29 VA. TAX REV. 277, 280-85 (2009) (describing the unsettled
state of the law). Another ALI innovation was the explicit statutory adoption of a bifurcation
approach to the disposition of property subject to a nonrecourse mortgage in excess of the
value of the property. 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at 38. Decades later, the Supreme Court
settled on a different approach. Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307-08 (1983).
65 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at 28, 114.
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approach in 1954, but finally did so three decades
later.66
–

A major revision of the rules for calculating the
portion of an annuity payment excludable from gross
income;67 Congress adopted the ALI approach in the
1954 Code.68

–

Elective relief provisions for taxpayers subject to
either the tax benefit rule69 or the claim of right
doctrine70 and adversely affected by differences in
marginal tax rates in different years;71 oddly, the 1954
Code followed the ALI approach in the case of the
claim of right doctrine, but not in the case of the tax
benefit rule.72

–

Elimination of the rule generally permitting capital
losses to be deducted only against capital gains;73
Congress has never been persuaded to follow the ALI’s
lead on this issue.

–

Extension of the nonrecognition treatment for
exchanges of like-kind property to sales of like-kind
property followed by purchases of like-kind replacement
property;74 neither the 1954 legislation nor later
legislation adopted this proposal.

–

Introducing the concept of “tainted” stock as a means of
preventing the use of dividends of preferred stock as a
device for distributing corporate earnings at capital

Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 421, 98 Stat. 494, 793-95.
1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at 47.
68 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 72(b), 68A Stat. 3, 20
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 72(b) (2011)).
69 Under the tax benefit rule, if an event occurs in a later year which is
fundamentally inconsistent with the taxpayer’s claiming of a deduction in an earlier
year, the taxpayer must offset the earlier deduction with a gross income inclusion in
the later year. Hillsboro Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r, 460 U.S. 370, 383-85 (1983).
70 Under the claim of right doctrine, if a taxpayer receives an amount in an
earlier year under a “claim of right” and includes that amount in gross income, but the
taxpayer is required to repay that amount because of developments in a later year, the
taxpayer is entitled to a deduction for the repayment in the later year. United States v.
Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 591-92 (1951).
71 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at 157-60.
72 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 1341, 68A Stat. at 348 (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 1341 (2011)).
73 1954 DRAFT, supra note 5, at 101-02.
74 Id. at 106.
66
67
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gains rates;75 the 1954 Code took the same basic
approach as the ALI’s Draft.76
–

Introduction of ownership attribution rules of
mechanical application, for use in determining
whether stock redemptions are to be taxed as
dividends or as sales;77 the 1954 Code followed the
ALI’s approach, with modifications.78

–

Extension of the so-called General Utilities rule
(under which a corporation did not recognize gain on
the in-kind distribution to its shareholders of
appreciated assets)79 to sales of assets by a closely-held
corporation in connection with a plan of complete
liquidation;80 the 1954 Code went even further,
applying the ALI approach to all liquidating
corporations, whether closely-held or public.81

–

A major change in the continuity-of-interest rules for
tax-free acquisitive reorganizations, under which
satisfaction of the continuity requirement depended
on the percentage of the stock of the acquiring
corporation owned by the shareholders of the target
corporation following the acquisition;82 Congress has
never enacted the ALI approach.83

–

The elimination of rules against “thin incorporation”;
under the ALI approach corporate debt owned
proportionately to stock would never be reclassified
merely because of the combination of the proportional

ALI VOLUME II, supra note 8, at 16-20.
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 306, 68A Stat. at 90-93 (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 306).
77 ALI VOLUME II, supra note 8, at 31-33.
78 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 318, 68A Stat. at 99-101 (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 318).
79 The
doctrine’s name is derived from the Supreme Court case
acknowledging the existence of the doctrine. Gen. Utils. & Operating Co. v. Comm’r,
296 U.S. 200, 206 (1935).
80 ALI VOLUME II, supra note 8, at 37-39.
81 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 337, 68A Stat. at 106-07 (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 337).
82 ALI VOLUME II, supra note 8, at 54-57.
83 Norris Darrell, despite his overall enthusiasm for the ALI’s February 1954
Draft, commented, “This particular provision in the Institute’s draft may not have been
a wise one; insufficient consideration may have been given to the theoretical or
practical factors involved, or both.” Darrell, supra note 9, at 22.
75
76
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ownership and a high ratio of insider debt to equity;84
Congress also has never enacted this approach.
The February 1954 Draft also proposed comprehensive
revisions of the provisions governing the income taxation of
trusts and of partnerships,85 and the influence of the draft on
the 1954 legislation in these areas was immense.
As the legislative fates of the ALI provisions mentioned
above suggest, the ALI was moderately successful in leaving its
imprint on the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Despite their
deep disagreement on the merits of the Income Tax Project,
William L. Cary and Norris Darrell agreed that the Draft
played a major role in shaping the new Code.86 The ALI Draft
influenced both the style and the substance of the 1954 Code.
In a number of areas, the Code followed the ALI’s drafting
preference for a more fully elaborated set of rules than had
been featured in the 1939 version of the Code. Cary noted with
disapproval, “In both instances [the 1954 Draft and the 1954
Code] the policy of the draftsmen seems to have been that tax
statutes should be as specific, detailed, and inclusive as
possible.”87 As for the ALI’s substantive influence on the 1954
Code, the results were mixed.
The ALI cared enough about the extent of its influence to
publish, early in 1955, a 30-page “Comparison of the American
Law Institute February, 1954 Income Tax Draft and 1954
Internal Revenue Code.”88 There were major successes. As the
ALI’s Comparison observed, the partnership tax provisions of the
1954 Code were “almost entirely in accord with” the sweeping
revisions of the ALI Draft.89 The ALI enjoyed another major
victory with respect to its proposed revisions of the income
taxation of trusts, as to which the 1954 Code was, again, “almost
entirely in accord with” the ALI Draft’s “complete revision.”90 The
1954 Code also followed the ALI’s lead on a number of narrower
issues, including the formula for determining the nontaxable
portion of an annuity payment, an attack on so-called preferred
stock bailouts, the introduction of detailed ownership attribution
ALI VOLUME II, supra note 8, at 2-3, 231-32.
Id. at 121-46 (trusts) and 86-119 (partnerships).
86 See supra text accompanying notes 9-11.
87 Cary, supra note 11, at 259.
88 A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX PROJECT: COMPARISON OF
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE FEBRUARY, 1954 INCOME TAX DRAFT AND 1954 INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE (1955) [hereinafter ALI COMPARISON].
89 Id. at 29.
90 Id. at 28.
84
85
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rules applicable to stock redemptions, and the extension of the
General Utilities doctrine to asset sales in connection with a plan of
complete liquidation.91
On the other hand, the new Code did not reflect the
Draft’s complete overhaul of the cancellation-of-indebtedness
provisions, because (according to the ALI) Congress had
decided that “more study [was] required.”92 Also left on the
cutting room floor by Congress were (among many other items)
the Draft’s elimination of the limitations on the deductibility of
capital losses, the extension of like-kind exchange gain
nonrecognition to sales followed by reinvestments, and the
elimination of the recharacterization of proportional debt as
equity because of a high debt to equity ratio.93
In a few areas, the Draft’s approach had no impact on
the 1954 Code, but was adopted by Congress decades later.
Examples include the enactment of an express gross income
inclusion for working condition fringe benefits in 1984, and the
adoption—also in 1984—of nonrecognition and transferred basis
rules for property transferred in connection with a divorce.94
There may have been some veiled disappointment in
ALI Director Goodrich’s 1955 Annual Report that Congress was
not more strongly influenced by the Draft:
We feel highly pleased with the contribution which our work made to
the revision of the income tax law. No one ever expected the
Congress to take it over bodily. Congress has its own responsibility
on such things and also its own ideas. The most we hoped to do was
to make a contribution on the technical side. That we did and that
we shall continue to do.95

One suspects that Goodrich did not think it altogether a
good thing that Congress had “its own ideas.” Darrell’s evaluation
of the success of the Income Tax Project was similar to Goodrich’s:
[N]o one, not even the Institute, could or did within reason expect
this private work to be officially taken over intact. The most that
could be or was hoped for was that a useful contribution could be
made—that at least parts of the work would find favor. That, it
would appear, has happened . . . . I believe that the time spent by the

91 See supra text accompanying notes 67-68 (annuities), 75-76 (bailouts), 7778 (attribution rules), and 80-81 (General Utilities).
92 ALI COMPARISON, supra note 88, at 2.
93 See supra text accompanying notes 73 (capital losses), 74 (like-kind
nonrecognition), and 84 (debt-equity ratio).
94 See supra text accompanying notes 60 (working condition fringes), and 6566 (divorce-related property transfers).
95 Herbert F. Goodrich, Report of the Director, 1955 A.L.I. ANN. REP. 5, 12.
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Institute was well spent and that, viewed in retrospect, the project
from the Institute’s standpoint can be considered successful.96

Despite the hints of disappointment in the post-mortems
of Goodrich and Darrell, the February 1954 Draft stands as a
major accomplishment—not only on its merits, but also for the
extent of its legislative influence. Given the immense difficulties
of persuading Congress to enact tax reform legislation, for the
Income Tax Project to have emerged from the 1954 legislative
process with half a loaf of influence was no trifling achievement.
That a group of private individuals could—without lobbying and
solely on the merits of their proposals—have a significant impact
on a major revision of the federal income tax is remarkable.
III.

EVALUATING THE PROJECT: THE ALI DRAFT, AVOIDING
THE IMPORTANT ISSUES, AND THE DREAM OF A SIMPLE
CODE

In the early 1960s two prominent tax professionals offered
two criticisms of the ALI’s 1954 Draft. Although the two criticisms
were completely different in substance, they were alike in raising
fundamental questions about the value of the ALI’s efforts.
Writing in 1961, prominent tax practitioner Louis
Eisenstein complained that the ALI’s Project was insufficiently
ambitious.97 Although the ALI claimed to avoid broad policy
questions and to concern itself only with technical matters,
Eisenstein argued that the ALI’s actual practice was to avoid
controversial issues while attending only to questions that
were noncontroversial (and therefore not very important):
Actually, the Institute handles many questions that are well within
the realm of “broad” policy. It only avoids those which fail to evoke
an “objective” spirit of togetherness . . . . On critical issues, then, the
Institute is “nonpartisan” only in the sense that it is discreetly
silent. If the Institute tried to speak, too many excited voices would
be heard. It is not difficult to be nonpartisan if one studiously avoids
partisan issues.98

There would have been little point, however, in the
ALI’s tackling any of the great tax policy controversies. The
great policy issues—the extent of progression in the rate
structure, for example—are intensely political. As an
organization with members from across the political spectrum,
96
97
98

Darrell, supra note 9, at 25.
LOUIS EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 168-69 (2010).
Id. at 168.
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the ALI could not have reached a consensus on any of those
issues. And even if by some miracle it had managed to do so,
Congress would have had no interest in deferring to the ALI’s
judgment on (for example) the optimal tax rate schedule.
Eisenstein was correct in his implication that the ALI was
doing little more, metaphorically speaking, than rearranging
the deck chairs on the ocean liner that was the Internal
Revenue Code. In that sense, it was a modest project. But there
is value to putting the deck chairs in order—as long as the ship
is not sinking, and in 1954 few thought that it was.
The other criticism was William Cary’s 1960 attack on
the ALI’s preferred style of statutory draftsmanship, which was
considerably more detailed than that of the 1939 Code.99
Although this critique found its fullest expression in Cary’s
post-Draft commentary, the ALI’s preference for elaboration was
controversial from the outset. At the 1949 ALI annual meeting,
ALI President Tweed recounted that one of the original members
of the Tax Policy Committee, Roscoe McGill, was so disappointed
that the Committee had rejected the goal of a “short, concise
tax statute” that he resigned from the Committee.100
From the perspective of 2013, it is difficult to evaluate
the criticism of the February 1954 Draft as inordinately
complex, because the Draft is immensely simpler than today’s
Internal Revenue Code. Cary does not claim that the Draft was
the apotheosis of complexity; indeed he notes that the Draft’s
“emphasis on specificity is as nothing by comparison with the
1954 Code.”101 And although Cary could not have known it in
1960, the complexity of the 1954 Code is itself as nothing by
comparison with that of today’s Code.102
It is fair to say, however, that most of the post-1954
increase in statutory complexity is due to substantive policy
choices of Congress, rather than to an ever-increasing preference
for statutory specification of detail. Some of those post-1954 policy
choices are widely applauded by tax technicians and policy
analysts.103 From today’s perspective, the 1954 Code was
Cary, supra note 11.
Remarks of Harrison Tweed, supra note 21, at 627.
101 Cary, supra note 11, at 265.
102 Cary did, however, fear that the worst was yet to come, writing,
“Undoubtedly some committee will still be worrying about these problems [of thin
incorporation and collapsible corporations] decades hence—when each of them may
well occupy at least twenty pages of the code.” Id. at 268.
103 For example, despite the complexity of section 1272 (requiring current
inclusion in gross income of original issue discount), few if any policy analysts would
favor a return to the economically inaccurate approach of prior law.
99

100
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shockingly defenseless against tax shelters.104 The additional
complexity attributable to various post-1954 anti-shelter
provisions is a price worth paying to safeguard the integrity of
the income tax.105
Much of the post-1954 increase in the length of the
Code, however, is attributable to the proliferation in recent
decades of tax expenditures of dubious merit. And much of the
increase in tax return computational complexity is due to the
alternative minimum tax (AMT) and various phaseout
provisions—with both the AMT and the majority of the phaseouts
being difficult or impossible to defend on the merits.106
Setting aside these post-1954 increases in the length of
the Code attributable to substantive policy choices of Congress
(some good, some bad), and focusing on Cary’s question of the
appropriate level of statutory detail to implement any given
legislative policy, what are the merits of his critique of the ALI’s
drafting philosophy? As between Cary and the ALI, the ALI has
by far the better of the argument. Consider what Cary offers as
“[o]ne of the best illustrations of the ALI philosophy”107—its
inclusion in the “keystone section” defining gross income of not
only a general definition of gross income, but also a non-exclusive
list of 20 items included in gross income. According to Cary, “no
satisfactory function was served by meticulously cataloguing the
various kinds of receipts that the courts have thus far held to
be income.”108
Cary’s verdict has a whiff of unconscious elitism.
Perhaps a list of 20 items included in gross income would have
served no purpose for Cary, because he was already aware of
all the judicial decisions distilled in the list. For a less expert
reader of the Code, however, it would be immensely easier to
determine the tax status of a particular type of receipt by
finding it in a list of gross income inclusions, than by tracking
down the authoritative judicial interpretation. Cary’s focus is
104 Tax shelters were then in their infancy. The first modern tax shelter case
to reach the Supreme Court, Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 362 (1960)
(involving a shelter based on a tax-motivated combination of tax-preferred income and
interest expense deductions), concerned tax years 1953 and 1954.
105 Although there are a number of more-or-less complex post-1954 antishelter provisions, probably the most significant are the passive loss rules of § 469,
enacted in 1986. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 501, 100 Stat. 2085,
2233 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 469 (2011)).
106 For a detailed discussion of the objections to the AMT and the various
phaseouts, see Lawrence Zelenak, Complex Tax Legislation in the TurboTax Era, 1
COLUM. J. TAX L. 91, 98-115 (2010).
107 Cary, supra note 11, at 265.
108 Id. at 266.
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on the Code’s word count, rather than on the lived complexity
of the tax laws. Even if the Code is considered in isolation—
apart from its judicial and regulatory interpretations—Cary’s
view is mistaken. A list is not complex; exceptions to exceptions
to exceptions generate complexity, but a mere list does not.
Cary makes a second, more important error—conflating
the Code with the tax laws (which include judicial and
administrative pronouncements, as well as the statute itself).
Omitting the list from the gross income provision would make
the Code shorter, but would actually make the tax laws more
complex for the average reader. By incorporating into the statute
important judicial glosses and administrative interpretations, the
ALI’s drafting strategy makes the tax laws simpler—more
transparent, more accessible, more comprehensible—for the
typical user. Cary never offers a satisfactory defense of his
fetishization of a low statutory word count, even at the price of
greater complexity of the tax laws in their entirety.
Cary does suggest an expertise-based reason for
preferring a short and simple tax statute: “Congress . . . is
performing the role formerly left to the Internal Revenue Service,
the Treasury, and the courts, and at the same time has no
thorough understanding of what it is enacting.”109 This aspect of
Cary’s critique does not depend on a fetishized concern with
complexity in the statute, without regard to the overall complexity
of the laws. One could conclude (correctly) that putting most of
the details in the regulations rather than in the statute does
not make the laws any simpler, and yet prefer putting the
details in the regulations because the Treasury Department is
likely to draft higher quality details than would Congress.
Nevertheless, this aspect of Cary’s critique is also unconvincing
for two reasons. First, the question of the relative detaildrafting skills of the staffs of the Treasury and of the taxwriting committees in Congress is a highly contingent one,
with different answers at different times (and perhaps even at
any given time, for different issues). Second, this aspect of
Cary’s critique fails utterly as a criticism of the ALI Draft,
because—as Cary himself conceded—the authors of the ALI
Draft were “superior craftsmen.”110 There is no reason to
suppose that the midcentury Treasury Department could have
produced detailed regulations superior to the ALI’s detailed
statutory provisions.
109
110

Id. at 260.
Id.
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POST-1954 ALI TAX PROJECTS, ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL

The ALI remained active in federal taxation after 1954.
Its first major post-1954 tax production was a 1958 “Report of
Working Views” (never submitted to the ALI membership for
approval) on the “Income Tax Problems of Corporations and
Shareholders.”111 Writing in 1961, Director Goodrich and
Associate Director Wolkin predicted that the ALI’s involvement in
tax policy would continue “[a]s long as there is worthwhile work
to do in the tax field.”112
The ensuing decades have borne out their prediction.
Highlights have included estate and gift tax recommendations
adopted by the ALI in 1968,113 proposals for the reform of the
tax treatment of corporate acquisitions and dispositions
(1980),114 proposals for the reform of the partnership tax
provisions of the Code (1982),115 proposals for the revision of the
income taxation of trusts and estates (1984),116 proposals for
reform of the taxation of foreign persons and of foreign-source
income (1986),117 proposals regarding United States income tax
treaties (1991),118 a 1993 Reporter’s Study of corporate tax
integration,119 and a 1999 Reporter’s Study of the taxation of
closely-held business enterprises.120
These proposals enjoyed a few legislative successes. For
example, a 1958 proposal for a detailed statutory definition of
corporate debt (as contrasted with equity)121 foreshadowed the
111 A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX PROJECT: INCOME TAX
PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS (1958) [hereinafter ALI TAX
PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS].
112 GOODRICH & WOLKIN, supra note 22, at 31.
113 A.L.I., WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, & A. JAMES CASNER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAXATION: RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTERS’ STUDIES (1969).
114 A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT SUBCHAPTER C: PROPOSALS ON
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS (1982) [hereinafter ALI SUBCHAPTER C].
115 A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT SUBCHAPTER K: PROPOSALS ON THE
TAXATION OF PARTNERS (1984).
116 A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER J: PROPOSALS ON THE
TAXATION OF TRUST AND ESTATE INCOME AND INCOME IN RESPECT OF DECEDENTS (1985).
117 A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED
STATES INCOME TAXATION: PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN
PERSONS AND OF THE FOREIGN INCOME OF UNITED STATES PERSONS (1987).
118 A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED
STATES INCOME TAXATION II: PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES (1992).
119 A.L.I. & ALVIN C. WARREN, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT:
INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXES AND REPORTER’S
STUDY OF CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION (1993).
120 A.L.I., GEORGE K. YIN & DAVID J. SHAKOW, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT:
TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES AND REPORTERS’ STUDY (1999).
121 ALI TAX PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 111,
at 62-63.
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1969 enactment of section 385 of the Code, which authorized the
Treasury to promulgate detailed regulations distinguishing debt
from equity.122 Perhaps the most significant post-1954 ALI
success in the tax legislative arena was the 1986 rejection of the
General Utilities doctrine,123 under which corporations had not
recognized gain on the in-kind distribution of appreciated assets
to their shareholders. The ALI’s 1980 Proposals on Corporate
Acquisitions and Dispositions had advocated the doctrine’s
demise,124 and Congress complied six years later.
On the whole, however, the ALI’s post-1954 tax efforts
have found less favor with Congress than the 1954 Draft did.
In part this may have been because the post-1954 proposals
were often more legislatively ambitious than the 1954 Draft in
calling for fundamental overhauls of some long-settled areas of
the law—for example, the 1993 proposal for the integration of
the corporate and individual income taxes, and the 1999
proposal of a new tax regime for private business enterprises.
Beyond the lesser influence on Congress of the later ALI
proposals, the striking difference between the post-1954 ALI
efforts and the 1954 Draft is the much narrower focus of the
later projects. The 1954 Draft encompassed almost the entirety
of the federal income tax; even viewed in the aggregate, the
more recent efforts have grappled with only a few subchapters.
Only once in the decades since 1954 has anyone even proposed
an ALI tax project of comparable scope to the 1954 Draft.
Writing in 1997, Harvard Law Professor Daniel Halperin
argued that the income tax could be saved only if “we” could
develop “a more accurate measure of income, one that would be
simpler, more efficient, and most importantly, fair.”125 For the
project he envisioned, comparable in scope to the 1954 Draft,
Halperin proposed the ALI’s process:
122 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 415, 83 Stat. 487, 613-14
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 385 (2011)). Although the enactment of § 385 counts as a
legislative success for the ALI, § 385 itself was ultimately a failure. In 1983 the
Treasury abandoned its efforts to promulgate regulations under its § 385 authority.
Treatment of Certain Interests in Corporations as Stock or Indebtedness, 48 Fed. Reg.
31054 (July 6, 1983). Section 385 remains in the Code, but the Treasury has never
resurrected the § 385 regulations project.
123 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085, 2269-75
(codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 311(b), 336).
124 ALI SUBCHAPTER C, supra note 114, at 105-19. The ALI’s was not the only
voice calling for the demise of the doctrine. See George K. Yin, General Utilities Repeal:
Is Tax Reform Really Going to Pass It By?, 31 TAX NOTES 1111, 1112 n.6 (1986) (citing
a number of calls for the rejection of the doctrine, including that of the ALI; Yin also
advocated the doctrine’s demise).
125 Daniel Halperin, Saving the Income Tax: An Agenda for Research, 77 TAX
NOTES 967, 967-68 (1997).
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What is essential is the ALI approach. Reporters to develop detailed
proposals that can easily be translated into a statutory draft, or even a
draft itself. Exposure of that draft to a diverse group of consultants who
will take the time to examine it closely and debate it among themselves.
Only in that way can we truly appreciate what is possible.126

Halperin’s proposal was extremely ambitious, but no
more so than the proposal leading to the 1954 Draft. Yet
whereas the midcentury ALI eagerly accepted the challenge of
drafting a nearly-complete income tax statute and brought the
project to fruition, at the century’s end neither the ALI nor any
other organization showed any interest in responding to
Halperin’s call.127
Part of the explanation for the differing responses in the
two eras may be that the Code has become too massive for
anyone to contemplate a comprehensive revision in the spirit of
the 1954 Draft. This would be especially true if a comprehensive
twenty-first century income tax project were to follow the 1954
Draft’s lead in proposing “technical” policy changes while taking
as a given Congress’s big-picture policy choices. The problem is
that in 2013, much more than in 1954, Congress’s big-picture
policy choices mandate very high levels of statutory detail.
Consider the original issue discount (OID) rules128—first
enacted in 1969,129 thoroughly revised in 1982,130 and
thoroughly revised again in 1984131—as one example drawn
Id. at 968.
The closest thing to a response to Halperin’s call is probably the “Shelf
Project.” Conceived and directed by Calvin H. Johnson, since 2007 the Project has
published in Tax Notes dozens of proposals to raise revenue by broadening in principled
ways the base of the income tax. Calvin H. Johnson, The Shelf Project: Revenue-Raising
Projects that Defend the Tax Base, 117 TAX NOTES 1077 (2007) (announcing the
Project); Calvin H. Johnson, Two Years of the Shelf Project, 126 TAX NOTES 513, (2010)
(describing the early publications of the Project). However, the Project bears only a
faint resemblance to the ALI’s 1954 Draft, for two reasons. First, the Project picks its
shots, by offering a number of narrowly targeted reform proposals rather than a
complete model tax statute. Second, rather than representing a consensus of dozens of
experts following several rounds of drafts and comments, the Project is largely the
work of one man. See Calvin H. Johnson, The Evolution of the Shelf Project, 137 TAX
NOTES 216, (2012) (noting that, as of September 2012, Johnson had authored 46 of the
67 published Shelf Project proposals).
128 Original issue discount is the excess of a debt instrument’s stated
redemption price at maturity over its issue price. It serves as an economic substitute
for explicitly-stated interest. Very generally, the OID rules provide for the
identification of OID and for its taxation as interest income to the holder of the debt
instrument.
129 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 413(a), 83 Stat. 487, 609-11
(repealed 1984).
130 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§ 231, 96 Stat. 324, 496-99 (repealed 1984).
131 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 41, 98 Stat. 494, 531-43
(codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1271-75 (2011)).
126
127
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from a large universe of potential examples. A twenty-first
century income tax project might try to reduce somewhat the
daunting complexity of the OID rules of the Code and
regulations, but the project would have to take the existence of
the OID rules as a given, because the decision to have such
rules is a big-picture policy decision. There is no way to
implement that policy decision with anything other than
complex rules. The authors of the 1954 Draft were not faced
with this source of complexity, because rules requiring
bondholders to report OID prior to the receipt of cash did not
exist at that time.
The same basic point could be made by reference to the
anti-tax shelter passive loss rules enacted in 1986,132 or any
number of other inherently complex post-1954 provisions. Since
1954 Congress has made numerous big-picture policy choices
that have, in the aggregate, hugely increased the Code’s
complexity. A comprehensive twenty-first century project in the
spirit of the 1954 Draft would have to accept those choices. In
accepting those choices, the drafters would be taking on a
challenge many times more formidable than the challenge
facing the midcentury drafters.
Perhaps the midcentury ALI had at its disposal the
services of tax policy giants imbued with a postwar spirit of
limitless optimism, and perhaps no such giants walk the earth
today. But even the authors of the 1954 Draft would probably
throw up their hands at the prospect of doing for today’s
Internal Revenue Code what they did for the Code of almost six
decades ago. A bit of fudging was required to call the 1954
Draft a complete model income tax statute. With its omission of
procedural provisions and some highly specialized substantive
provisions,133 the 1954 Draft was not quite a complete model
statute. Today, however, no remotely plausible amount of
fudging could make manageable a repeat of the midcentury
project. The late 1940s and early 1950s presented a unique set
of circumstances under which the 1954 Draft was possible: a
Code still simple enough that a not-quite-complete draft of its
revision could fit on a few hundred printed pages; an elite tax
bar that had, perhaps, only recently become large enough and
sophisticated enough to meet the challenge; and a pervasive
postwar can-do spirit.
132 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 501, 100 Stat. 2085, 2233
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 469).
133 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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A complete draft of a model income tax statute might be
doable even today, if the drafters were willing to jettison the
1954 Draft’s philosophy of accepting Congress’s big-picture policy
choices, and if the drafters consistently opted for simpler
approaches than those of the current Code. But a model statute
that paid no deference to existing legislative decisions on major
policy questions would probably be of little or no interest to
Congress. Thus, a major motivation for the authors of the 1954
Draft—the prospect that much of their work would find its way
into the Internal Revenue Code—would be missing under this
approach.
In sum, the drafting of a model statute accepting the
major policy choices embodied in the current Internal Revenue
Code is too daunting a task for the ALI (or anyone else), and
the alternative of drafting a model statute without deference to
existing legislative policy choices may be a quixotic endeavor if
the goal is to influence legislation. As a result, we may never
again see an income tax project—from the ALI or any other
source—comparable to the 1954 Draft.
CONCLUSION
Despite the virtual impossibility today of a repeat of the
ALI’s 1954 performance, two promising avenues remain for
ALI tax projects. The first is simply the continuation of the
ALI’s post-1954 approach of focusing on narrow aspects of the
income tax—typically on one or another subchapter of the Code.
In particular, one area comes to mind where an ALI project could
perform a very valuable service. Congress recently codified the
anti-tax-shelter economic substance doctrine,134 but in such a way
that most of the pre-codification judicial development of the
doctrine retains its vitality. As it happens, however, the case law
in this crucial area is a complete muddle.135 An ALI Restatement
of the economic substance doctrine—and it would be a
Restatement, because the point of the project would be to bring
order and clarity to existing law, rather than to change the
law—could be tremendously useful to the courts, to taxpayers,
and to the Internal Revenue Service.

134 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111152, § 1409(a), 124 Stat. 1029, 1067-70 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o) (2011)).
135 On the existence of the muddle, see, e.g., David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the
Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235, 236 (1999). The doctrine has not
become much less tangled in the years since Hariton’s article appeared.
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The second possibility is to reject the requirement that
any project must have a high probability of being reflected in
legislation in the near term. Having thrown off that constraint,
the ALI’s tax experts would be free to dream. Unfettered by a rule
that only “technical” policy choices are up for grabs, the ALI’s
drafters might pursue Halperin’s quest for a deep rethinking of
the ways an income tax code measures income, or some other goal
of equal audacity. The legislative prospects of such a project
would surely be poorer than those of a project in the spirit of the
1954 Draft, but if enough legislators come to view the current
income tax as fundamentally broken the odds against the
legislative success of the project might not be impossibly long.

